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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : Priority No. 13 
CHARLES MONTGOMERY, : Case No. 
Defendant/Petitioner. : Case No. 910284-CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals erroneous conclude that 
the State's position regarding waiver of error at the trial 
court level regarding the contents of a jury instruction on 
reasonable doubt preclude defendant from raising the same as 
plain error for the first time on appeal contrary to State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989)? 
2. Did the trial court commit error in failing to 
consider prior to sentencing, defendant's assertion of error 
in the reasonable doubt instruction as outlined in Cage v. 
Louisiana, 498 US , 112 L Ed 339, 111 S Ct 328 (November 13, 
1990) (Addendum A) (Though decided November 13, 1990, it was 
first published January 15, 1991, in L.Ed 2d Advanced Reports) 
and State v, Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1990) decided on 
December 13, 1990 after the jury verdict but prior to 
sentencing contrary to State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258? (Utah 
1983) 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of Appeals on its own motion set this matter 
for disposition pursuant to Rule 31, Utah Rules of Appellant 
Procedure. (Addendum B) After oral argument on March 30, 
1992, under date of March 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals 
issued its opinion (Addendum C) affirming the trial court 
which declined to grant defendant a new trial or an arrest of 
judgment. (Addendum D). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or 
rule provisions pertinent to the questions presented for 
review is contained in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Charles Montgomery was originally charged 
with the crime of attempted murder (§76-5-203(1)(b)), a second 
decree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101. He was 
-2-
convicted on December 4, 1990. He was convicted of a lesser 
included offense of attempted Manslaughter, a third decree 
felony, in violation of §76-4-101 and §76-5-205 U.C.A. as 
amended. On April 23, 1991 defendant was sentenced and is 
presently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for a term not 
to exceed five (5) years with a parole date of April 13, 
1993. (Addendum E) . 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant raised the defense of self defense, i.e. 
defense of self and habitat. The trial court instructed the 
jury, without objection, that reasonable doubt should be 
considered based upon "the more weighty and important matters 
relating to your affairs". Instruction No. 5 (Addendum F). 
This terminology has been found to be explicitly erroneous in 
State v. Pedersen, supra and Cage v. Louisiana, supra and 
earlier cases cited therein. Though State v. Johnson, 774 
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) abandoned the "more weighty and 
important" terminology in a reasonable doubt instruction, it 
was not until State v. Pedersen, supra that the majority of 
this court adopted Justice Stewart's dissent as found in State 
v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989). Pedersen found such 
terminology to be error and grounds for reversal of a 
conviction. 
-3-
CONCLUSION 
The state having confined its respondent's argument in 
the Court of Appeals solely to the question of waiver by the 
attorney who tried the case, and not this writer, obviously 
confessed error in the giving of such instruction and the 
denial by the trial court of a Motion for a New Trial or in 
the Alternative for an Arrest of Judgment. The sole question 
before this court, defendant submits, is whether or not plain 
error, clear error or any other similar semantical phrase can 
be waived to the detriment of defendant herein or whether the 
rule of State v. Anderton, supra should apply. This case 
permits appellant court consideration of post trial case 
decisions rendered after trial and before decision by the 
appellant court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /_ day of April, 1992. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
ROB^RT^f. McRAE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four 
copies of the foregoing to the following on this / day of 
April, 1992. 
-4-
f 
Mr. R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General 
Mr. David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
R<PERT M. MCRAE 
ADDENDUM A 
TOMMY CAGE, Petitioner 
v 
LOUISIANA 
498 US —, 112 L Ed 2d 339, 111 S Q ^ 
[No. 89-7302] 
Decided November 13, 1990. 
Decision: Instruction in Louisiana homicide trial defining "reasonable 
doubt" in terms of "grave" or "substantial" uncertainty and of need for 
"moral certainty" held to violate due process clause. 
SUMMARY 
In a Louisiana trial court, a defendant was convicted of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to death after the jury was instructed, in part, that it 
must acquit the defendant if it entertained a reasonable doubt as to any 
element necessary to constitute his guilt, but that this doubt must be such 
"as would give rise to a grave uncertainty" and must be "an actual 
substantial doubt," and that what is required is "a moral certainty." On 
appeal, the defendant contended that this instruction was improper; but the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana—wrhile noting that the phrases "grave uncer-
tainty" and "moral certainty," if taken out of context, might overstate the 
requisite degree of uncertainty and confuse the jury—determined that, 
taking the instructions as a whole, reasonable persons of ordinary intelli-
gence would understand the definition of reasonable doubt (554 So 2d 39). 
Granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and granting certiorari, the 
United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana and remanded the case for further proceedings. In a per 
curiam opinion expressing the unanimous view of the court, it was held that 
the instruction violated the reasonable doubt requirement protected by the 
due process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, 
because (1) the words "substantial" and "grave," as they are commonly 
understood, suggested a higher degree of doubt than was required for 
acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard, and (2) when those state-
ments were considered with the reference to "moral certainty," rather than 
evidentiary certainty, it became clear that a reasonable juror could have 
339 
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interpreted the instructions to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of 
proof below that required by the due process clause. 
HEADNOTES 
Classified to U.S Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers* Edition 
Appeal §§910.6, 951, 1692.3; Con- pauperis; (2) grant the individual's 
stitutional Law §§ 840.3, 845 — petition for a writ of certiorari; and 
due process — burden of (3) reverse the state appellate court's 
proof — jury instructions — judgment, and remand the case for 
in forma pauperis proceed- further proceedings, on the ground 
ings — grant of certiorari — that the state trial court's instruc-
remand tion to the jury explaining the re-
la-lc. With respect to a state ap- quirement that the individual's guilt 
pellate court decision affirming an be proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
individual's conviction for first-de- —which instruction stated in part 
gree murder, the United States Su- that a "reasonable" doubt must be 
preme Court will (1) grant the indi- such "as would give rise to a grave 
vidual leave to proceed in forma uncertainty" and must be "an actual 
TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY* REFERENCES 
21A Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §782; 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial 
§§ 756, 827-842 
9 Federal Procedure, L Ed, Criminal Procedure §§22 859, 
22 860 
7 Federal Procedural Forms, L Ed, Criminal Procedure 
§ 20.933 
8 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Criminal Procedure, Form 
358 
USCS, Constitution, Amendment 14 
US L Ed Digest, Appeal §§ 910.6, 951, 1692 3; Constitutional 
Law § 840 3, 845 
Index to Annotations, Due Process; Instructions to Jury; 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
Auto-Cite*: Cases and annotations referred to herein can be 
further researched through the Auto-Cite* computer-as-
sisted research service. Use Auto-Cite to check citations for 
form, parallel references, prior and later history, and anno-
tation references. 
ANNOTATION REFERENCE 
Supreme Court's views as to prejudicial effect in criminal case of 
erroneous instructions to jury involving burden of proof or presumptions. 
92 L Ed 2d 862 
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(1990) 112 L Ed 2d 339 
substantial doubt," and that what 
was required was "a moral cer-
tainty"—is invalid under the due 
process clause of the Federal Consti-
tution's Fourteenth Amendment, be-
cause (a) the words "substantial" 
and "grave," as they are commonly 
understood, suggest a higher degree 
of doubt than is required for acquit-
ted under the reasonable doubt stan-
dard, and (b) when those statements 
are considered with the reference to 
"moral certainty," rather than evi-
dentiary certainty, it becomes clear 
that a reasonable juror could have 
interpreted the instruction to p^ow 
a finding of guilt based on * degree 
of proof below that r^aired by the 
due process clause 
Constitution** Law § &40.3 — due 
pror*&s — burden of proof 
2 In state criminal trials, the due 
Per Curiam. 
[1a] The motion of petitioner for 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis 
and the petition for a writ of certio-
rari are granted. 
[2] In state criminal trials, the 
Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment "protects the ac-
cused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime with which he is charged." 
Ir^re Winship, 397 US 358, 364, 25 L 
K T S O S S T ^ S a 1068 (1970); see 
also Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 
315-316, 61 L Ed 2d 560, 99 S a 
2781 (1979). This reasonable doubt 
standard "plays a vital role in the 
American scheme of criminal proce-
dure." Winship, 397 US, at 363, 25 L 
Ed 2d 368, 90 S Ct 1068. Among 
other things, tf[i]t is a prime instru-
ment for reducing the risk of convic-
tions resting on factual error." Ibid. 
process clause of the Federal Consti-
tution's Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he 
or she is charged. 
Appeal § 1258 — principles of re-
view — jury induction 
3. In cons^^g a state trial 
court's induction to the jury in a 
murd*' ^ a l ^ t° the meaning of 
tw requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, in order to deter-
mine whether that instruction met 
the requirements of tW> due process 
clause of the Federal Constitution's 
Fourteenth Amendment, the "United 
States Supreme Court will consider 
how reasonable jurors could have 
understood the charge as a whole. 
The issue before us is whether the 
reasonable doubt instruction in this 
case complied with Winship. 
Petitioner was convicted in a Loui-
siana trial court of first-degree mur-
der, and was sentenced to death. He 
appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana, arguing, inter alia, that 
the reasonable doubt instruction 
used in the guilt phase of his trial 
was constitutionally defective. The 
instruction provided in relevant 
part: 
"If you entertain a reasonable 
doubt as to any fact or element 
necessary to constitute the defen-
dant's guilt, it is your duty to give 
him the benefit of that doubt and 
return a verdict of not guilty. 
Even where the evidence demon-
strates a probability of guilt, if it 
does not establish such guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, you must 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
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acquit the accused. This doubt, 
however, must be a reasonable 
one, that is one that is founded 
upon a real tangible substantial 
basis and not upon mere caprice 
and conjecture. It must be such 
doubt as would give rise to a grave 
uncertainty, raised in your mind 
by reasons of the unsatisfactory 
character of the evidence or lack 
^hereof. A reasonable doubt is not 
a Kiore possible doubt. It is an 
actual b^hstantial doubt It is a 
doubt that a reasonable man can 
seriously entertain What is re-
quired is not an absolute or math-
ematical certainty, but a moral 
certainty/' State v Cage 554 5o 2d 
39, 41 (La 1989) (emphasis added). 
fib] The Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana rejected petitioner's argument. 
The court first observed that the use 
of the phrase- "grave uncertainty" 
and "moral certainty" in the in-
struction, "if taken out of context, 
might overstate the requisite degree 
of uncertainty and confuse the jury." 
Ibid But "taking the charge as a 
whole," the court concluded that 
"reasonable persons of ordinary in-
telligence would understand the defi-
nition of 'reasonable doubt' " Ibid It 
is our view, however, that the in-
struction at issue was contrary to 
the "beyond a reasonable doubt'1 re-
quirement articulated in Wmship. 
• Similar attempts to define reasonable 
doubt ha\e been widel) criticized by the Fed-
eral Courta of Appeals See, e g, Monk v 
Zelez, 901 F2d 885, 889-890 (CA10 1990), 
United States v Moss, 756 F2d 32% 333 (CA4 
[1c, 3] In construing the instruc-
tion, we consider how reasonable 
jurors could have understood the 
charge as a whole. Francis v Frank-
lin, 471 US 307, 316, 85 L Ed 2d 344, 
105 S Ct 1965 (1985). The charge did 
at one point instruct that to convict, 
guilt must be found beyond a reason-
able doubt; but it then equated a 
reasonable doubt with a "grave un-
certainty" and an "actual substan-
tial doubt," and stated that what 
was required was a "moral cer-
tainty" that the defendant was 
guilty. It is plain to us that the 
words "substantial" and "grave," as 
they are commonly understood, sug-
gest a higher degree of doubt than is 
required for acquittal under the rea-
sonable doubt standard When those 
statements are then considered with 
the reference to "moral certainty," 
rather than evidentiary certainty, it 
becomes clear that a reasonable ju-
ror could have interpreted the in-
struction to &11OT a finding of guilt 
based on a degree <d proof below 
that required by the Dye Process 
Clause * 
Accordingly, the judgment of the 
Supreme €Wr$ of Louisiana is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceeding not inconsistent 
with this opinion 
It is so ordered 
1985) United States v Indorato, 628 F2d 711, 
720-721 (CAl 1980), United States v ByTd, 352 
F2d 570, 575 (CA2 1965), see also Taylor v 
Kentuck}, 436 US 478, 488, 56 L Ed 2d 468, 
96 S a 1930 (1978) 
342 
ADDENDUM B 
FEB 0 7 13:? 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Robert M. McRae, Esq. 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Charles Kenneth Montgomery, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
--00O00--
NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND ASSIGNMENT TO 
RULE 31 CALENDAR 
Case No. 910284-CA 
This case has been set for oral argument on Monday, March 30, 1992 at 
9:00 a.m. before this court at 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City. 
Oral argument is limited to fifteen minutes per side. Following argument, the 
case will be submitted for an expedited decision pursuant to Rule 31. If any 
or all parties wish to waive oral argument, a written statement to that effect 
must be filed in the clerk's office on or before February 19, 1992. 
Oral argument will not be continued absent a proper motion and 
stipulation of all parties. A motion for continuance will be granted only 
upon a showing of exigent circumstances. Specifically, a continuance will not 
be granted for reasons of a scheduling conflict, including a previously 
scheduled appearance in a lower court. If all parties do not stipulate to the 
continuance or if an emergency circumstance is not shown, oral argument will 
proceed as herein scheduled. 
Counsel, if a party is represented by counsel, or the party must 
complete the information requested below and return this notice to the Court 
of Appeals no later than February 19, 1992. 
This 5th day of February 1992. BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
I certify that this case has not been settled, discharged or stayed by 
bankruptcy, or otherwise rendered moot. If this case should be settled, 
discharged or stayed by bankruptcy, or otherwise rendered moot, I will notify 
the Court as soon as possible in accordance with Rule 37, Utah R. App. P. I 
understand that failure to take such action may be grounds for sanctions under 
Rule 40, U^ah /. App. P. or for contempt of court under UCA 78-32-1 et. seq. 
Signature of Attorney of Record Date 
NOTE: A CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Of OPPOSING COUNSEL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
copy of the Notice of Oral Argument to Mr. R. Paul Van Dam and 
Mr. David B. Thompson, Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114 this / day of February, 
1992. 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
MAR 3 1 1 9 9 2 
Nrfar / r : *ccnan 
CBark o< \n* Court 
Utah CouU ci Appeals 
S t a t e of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Charles Montgomery, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 910284-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Jackson ( jie "'•'!). 
This case is before the court pursuant "o Rule 31, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. 
Dated this 3/ day of March, 1992. 
Regnal WKG^arff^ Judgrf / 
fa&&v>0?rz 
Norman H. Jajg^sbn, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of April, 1992, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed below: 
Robert M. McRae 
McRae & DeLand 
Attorney at Law 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Eighth District Court Trial Ct. No. #9018004 FS. 
148 East Main 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Honorable Dennis L. Draney 
District Court Judge 
Uintah County Courthouse 
147 East Main 
Vernal, UT 84078 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney 
General's Office to be delivered to the parties listed below: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
Kenneth A. Bronston 
David B. Thompson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Governmental Affairs 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Dated this 1st day of April, 1992• 
Deputy^Clerk 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH ^C/l . 
- % - ^ - - - % - - - -
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES KENNITH MONTGOMERY, 
Defendant . 
^ 
'0 
R U L I N G 
Case No. 901800004 FS 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, and Motion for Arrested 
Judgment are denied. The court rules that the jury instructions now 
questioned by the Defendant accurately explained the law applicable 
to the case and the responsibility of the jury. Additionally, the 
Defendant has not shown by the record that he objected to the 
questioned instructions at trial. 
DATED this %rfh day of May, 1991 
BY THE COURT: 
DENNIS L. DRANEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
cc: JoAnn B. Stringham 
ADDENDUM E 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The status of MOaZ^Qblku, C 1AAUBS K , USP No. 20706 , OBSCIS No. 59980 
came before the UtafTState Board of ^ ferdons on the ^ th day of August, 1991, 
for tne following considerations 
ORIGINAL SEARING 
c
*5? 0 F COMMITMENT COUjfcar-teE*! JUDGE EXPIRATION 
MANSLAUGHTER "5 9018OOO4~FS~ DRANEY Cl/04/19%~ 
01BEE 
After the statement of %j^^/<f<axj£ j ^ t ^ ^ r ^ ^ and the following witnesses, 
i) . — ^ — h & ^~ * 
and for good cause appearing, the Board of Pardons made the following decision: 
Rescind parole date, 
^ Begin parole on (/~/j?>~f3 »wlth the following special conditions: 
2
- ^Mc/^ r9S"7/,o?
 5t <^<^^.if j&t 
ttkd parole agreement to add/delet^ /iaodify the conditions described above 
Terminate sentence (including parole supervision) on 
Expiration of sentinca to be effective on __ W^_ I -__ P B 
Schedule rehearing for ^ 
Otner: 
The reasons for this decision are identified on the attached page. 
At thb discretion of Jthe 6oard of Pai^io|s^this decision is^subject to review 
and modification at any time prior to actual release from custody. 
By on*er of the Boat"! of Pardons of the State of Utah, I affix my signature on 
behalf of the Chairman of the Board this 9th daj of August, 1991* 
/&-
TfTT. HA3K, Chairman 
ADDENDUM F 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER w 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
that satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. A 
reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful, 
or imaginary, because almost everything related to human 
affairs is open to some possible doubt. A reasonable doubt 
is one which is real and is based upon reason and one which 
reasonable men and women would have upon a consideration of 
all the evidence. It must arise from the evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of 
the evidence, you can honestly say that you are not satisfied 
of the Defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if 
after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding 
conviction of Defendant's guilt such as you would be willing 
to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating 
to your affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. 
